3
EC Commission, Communication on IPRs and Standardization, COM(1992) 445, section 6.2 (General Principles), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1222/ http://aei.pitt.edu/1222/ . 4
Report by the UMTS IPR Working Group, "Third Generation Mobile Communications: The Way Forward for IPR", January 1999, available at http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/PCG/PCG_01/Docs/PCG1_11.pdf http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/PCG/PCG_01/Docs/PCG1_11.pdf . See also Ericsson's Comments on the European Commission's White Paper on ICT Standardisation, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/files/consultation_standardisation_2009/128_ericsson_en.pdf http://ec.europa.e u/enterprise/sectors/ict/files/consultation_standardisation_2009/128_ericsson_en.pdf . 5
European Commission Notice -Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 [now Article 101 TFUE] to horizontal cooperation agreements, OJ C3, January 6, 2001 January 6, , at 25, para. 169 (2001 ("Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements"). These were updated in 2010 by the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C11/1, January 14, 2011, at 1. See especially the sections on standardsetting agreements, para. 257ff. 6
Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements, above, para. between two computer systems should be distinguished from "compatibility" (whether a software or hardware component of a computer system can be substituted by another component without modification) and "portability" (whether a software or hardware component of a computer system or piece of software can be modified or adjusted to become part of another computer system). The Microsoft judgment did not cover those notions.
indicated by a series of recent debates and cases (such EIF, 8 Microsoft, 9 Rambus, 10 Qualcomm,
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IPCom, 12 and the 2011 Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements 13 ). The debate is on occasion conducted with fundamentalist fervor, pitching proponents of unlimited IPRs on one side of the spectrum against the open source community on the other. It is useful, therefore, to analyze the debate from a coolly rational policy perspective, and ask whether the rules could not be adjusted to accommodate different situations in different industry sectors.
At the root of the problem is a conflict between measures to resolve two different market failures: the "tragedy of the commons" and the "tragedy of the anti-commons".
We all know the "tragedy of the commons", the overuse of public goods controlled by no one. In the 18th Century, it was found that common land in Britain was overexploited, because each user had an individual interest in letting the maximum number of cattle freely graze on it, with the result that the fields were exhausted, and everyone suffered.
14 Even today, we poison ourselves or even risk changing our climate, because we produce goods the price of which does not include the cost imposed on society caused by the pollution of "free" air, soil and water (a "price externality"). Private restraints or public regulation may be needed to solve this market failure. Similar thinking led to the adoption of intellectual property laws. Innovators invest and sink funds in the creation of ideas and their expression. If all ideas were free and we all enjoyed full freedom to copy expression, imitators could enter the market without limitation, free riding on the innovators' investments. To allow creators to raise price above marginal costs for a while and thus recover sunk R&D costs and be compensated for risk, IPRs exclude competition from imitators for some 8 European Interoperability Framework, available at http://ec.europa.eu/isa/strategy/doc/annex_ii_eif_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/isa/strategy/index_en.htm. . For a comment, see Mark Bohannon, "European Interoperability Framework Supports opened, December 17, 2010, available at http://opensource.com/government/10/12/europeaninteroperability-framework-supports-openness. Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007 ) ("Deception in a consensus-driven private standard-setting environment harms the competitive process by obscuring the costs of including proprietary technology in a standard and increasing the likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent holder […] Deceptive FRAND commitments, no less than deceptive nondisclosure of IPRs, may result in such harm"); See also Japan FTC Cease and Desist Order Against Qualcomm, September 20, 2009 (on appeal) European Commission Notice -Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C11/1, January 14, 2011, at 1, para. 257ff. 14 G. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859 (December 13, 1968 ), p. 1243 -1248 time, subject to conditions. Thus, patent law "secures to the inventor, for a limited time, the exclusive use of his invention; and thereby adds the fuel of interest to the fire of genius."
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Less well known is the opposite phenomenon, the "tragedy of the anti-commons." This is the under-use of private goods that are controlled by more than one rightholder. Michael Heller in his fascinating Gridlock Economy mentions a series of arresting examples.
16 Just a few: the banks of the Rhine are dotted with a sequence of picturesque robber baron castles, each of whom raised tolls on Rhine river traffic, with the result that no one used the river and no one received toll revenues. Google Book Search is being blocked by a multiplicity of rightholders in Europe, with the foreseeable outcome that orphan works remain dead, neither Google nor the European rightholders or libraries will make any money, and readers are deprived of access. And with every 3G cell phone being covered by thousands of patent families, each essential patent owner can block every other one, which the risk that no technology owner can use its technology without striking a compromise with the others.
17
This is where standards and open source come in. As IT progresses, more and more products are compound items, made of many components incorporating technology co-owned by many different patent holders, manufactured by a series of different producers, and interoperating with other complex products. The computer and the mobile phone are perfect examples. They are multipart combinations of software, processors, modems, and electrical components, and are in turn part of networks that include other complex products (servers, base stations, routers, switches, servers and related network products). If each component manufacturer chose its preferred technology, these products could not interoperate in a network and no one could compete (or in exceptional cases, a manufacturer could gradually monopolize all key products in a closed network, chilling innovation 18 ).
By compromising and selecting a common standard, producers are able to break the logjam. If they are truly open, standards allow "best of breed" components from different manufacturers to be combined, with maximum efficiency. Creating a standard, however, raises the risk of a tragedy of anti-commons at a higher level: patent "hold-up". Once an industry has agreed to a standard, and especially after producers have implemented it, industry becomes "locked in". Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007 ), III.A.2.b.: "Although a patent confers a lawful opportunity for unscrupulous IPR owners whose intellectual property is essential for the standard. In the example of 3G cell phones mentioned above (with about 6,000 patent families for the air interface alone), even if all patent owners agree to license, each may have an incentive to threaten manufacturers with an injunction, a threat to kill their business, to extract extortionist fees -the commercial counterpart of Dick Turpin's "Your money or your life". A hold-up using a single patent on a single component can kill an entire product. Because cooperative innovation in today's IT and telecom products fragments technology ownership (the 6,000 patent families mentioned above are owned by dozens of different firms), this risk is multiplied many times. If one patent holder makes his get-away after holding up another, others are encouraged to do the same.
When first confronted with this problem, industry players responded by developing a portfolio of countervailing patents. This is like an arsenal of nuclear missiles, with everybody pointing a missile at everyone else. If one player asserts patent rights against another, it is immediately counter-sued by the accused party. Firms even enter into mutual defense pacts. 20 This cold war situation of Mutually Assured Destruction is hardly ideal. Too much effort goes into mining patents on too many trivial ideas. More important, it is no defense against patent trolls, nonvertically integrated firms that mine patents or buy them up from bankrupt estates to join a feeding frenzy, and who have nothing to lose from a counter-suit, since they do not engage in production.
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The IPCom and Rambus cases come to mind. 22 In a situation like this, strength becomes a weakness, since the largest producers are most vulnerable to the smallest opportunistic patent holder. This asymmetrical warfare even creates opportunity for strategic behaviour, where manufacturers are tempted to finance third-party IPR litigation against competitors, 23 or to spin off patent portfolios to kill rivals or hold them up with a view to raising rivals' costs. 24 com ) . While many of these may be beneficial, the model is not without risk to industry and consumers, since some of the profit-oriented entities might eventually be tempted to evolve into a Ponzi scheme, start holding up industry members that have not joined them, or resell the patents to third parties that do so. 21 Trolls are sometimes called "non-practicing entities". New technology business models such as patent trading and "patent mining" are not necessarily bad. The existence of a market for patents may foster innovation, and allow firms or groups like the Open Innovation network to acquire patents for defensive purposes. At the same time, patent traps and royalty traps ("hold-up") may discourage investment, where remuneration is taken away from the person who incurred R&D costs and bore the risk of product development -in a situation where bringing products to market may well be more costly, more risky and more beneficial to consumers. The key is to intervene to prevent inefficient holdups, including "opportunistic behavior on the part of patent owners that threatens to impose (1) Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. , 486 U.S. 492 (1988) . 36 Cf. Article 101(3) TFEU. Interoperability refers to the ability of information and communication technology systems and the business process they support to exchange data with fidelity and to enable sharing and utilization of information and knowledge. For citizens, interoperability means they can access, provide and utilize government information using the IT solutions of their choice, without being stymied by closed, proprietary hardware or software solutions that do not support open standards. See IBM paper "Open Standards, Open Source, Interoperability and Government Policy", above, footnote 32. 37 See Rambus, above, footnote 10. 38 It has been argued that injunctions should be allowed in standards context subject only to the criteria of abusive litigation, which would be the case if the proceedings cannot be regarded as an attempt to enforce legitimate rights but only serve to harass and if they are part of a framework of a plan to eliminate the competition (ITT/Promedia, [1998] ECR II-2937). But that ignores the crucial element distinguishing standard setting from a normal situation, namely, that the IPR owners have promised to license on FRAND terms, the standards organization has relied on it leading to an agreement to limit inter-technology competition that would otherwise have existed, and the industry has relied on it by making investments in innovation. Having made such a promise and obtained monopoly as a result, it should be an abuse of dominance to seek injunctive relief to extract royalties higher than those that would have pertained in ex ante inter-technology competition.
licensee cannot pay or refuses to pay a FRAND rate. For the same reason, termination of a license should not be allowed at will, but only for (actual or anticipatory) material breach that cannot be remedied, or if the licensee refuses to license its essential IPR ("defensive suspension"). Finally, there should be no constructive refusal to license, for instance, by demands for treble damages or imposition of excessive fees. 39 An injunction is not justified if the purpose is to magnify the bargaining power of the patentee and expropriate all or almost all profits that the defendant made or expects to make from a complex product implementing a standard. 40 This raises the thorny question of fair pricing. 41 Under Article 102(a) TFEU (ex 82 EC), indeed, dominant firms are prohibited from "directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions." This covers using market power derived from having been included in a standard, to charge excessive prices or impose unjustifiably onerous or unfair terms. The European Court of Justice has confirmed that it may be a violation of Article 102 TFEU (ex 82 EC) for an undertaking in a dominant position to charge a price that is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided or the good supplied. 42 In Port of Helsingborg, the European Commission confirmed the "value" criterion and used various proxies to conclude that no violation had occurred in that particular case. 43 To determine the inherent value, and prevent disputes as much as possible, competition law now allows ex ante open disclosures of prices and license terms, and even technology auctions. 44 In complex standards, however, this is unfortunately often infeasible, because standards take several years to develop, with a sequence of The former option -a policy of avoiding all patents that are not available on royalty-free terms without restriction -is adequate and pro-competitive so long as it does not prejudice incentives to innovate. New revenue models suggest, in fact, that at least in the software sector, IPR protection is not the only model encouraging innovation. The W3C's Internet open standards are IPR-free or royalty-free, and are arguably one of the greatest platforms for innovation that the world has seen. Open source software development is encouraged by the prospect of revenues from upgrades, services and complementary products rather than on royalty income (although it depends on the existence of copyright to ensure that open source license conditions are passed on).
46 Innovative advertising-funded or transaction-funded IT services do not rely on fees from users, and in twosided markets, giving away one product for free may generate demand for another fee-paying product. The development of free APIs and free interoperability information for a software platform pays for itself because it makes the platform more attractive as additional complementary products become available for it. 47 The cost of bringing software to market is less then for tangible products. All of these factors are especially pertinent in industries where network effects are strong, because success feeds on itself and magnifies the potential income from these alternative revenue models. These examples from the software area suggest that software-to-software interoperability standards can and should be royalty-free. 48 The beauty of royalty free interoperability standards is that they can be implemented in both open source and proprietary software, thus allowing both types of products to compete on quality and functionality.
In other areas, such as mobile telecommunications networks and computer hardware, the situation In these areas, mandating royalty-free licensing would likely recreate a tragedy of commons and discourage innovation, while allowing IPR owners to charge at will could create a tragedy of anticommons. To strike the right balance, therefore, a contract of mutual restraint is necessary. This was the intent of the IPR Rules adopted by ETSI in the 1990s, which called for essential IPR owners to commit (before a standard is finalized, at a time that inter-technology and inter-standard competition is still viable) to charge "fair and reasonable" royalties. 49 This is also mandated by Article 101(3) TFEU (ex Art. 81(3) EC): in exchange for being allowed to restrict inter-technology competition by agreeing to choose one technology for a standard and exclude others, the conditions for exemption must be met: competition in the products implementing the standard must not be eliminated, and consumers must get a fair share of the benefit. It is also mandated by Article 102(a) and (c) TFEU (ex Art 82(a) and (c) EC) which prohibit a dominant firm (the owner of ex post essential patents) from imposing unfair and discriminatory terms, especially where licensees made investments in legitimate reliance on the FRAND promise.
Unfortunately, a contract of mutual restraint can exist only if and so long as everyone plays by the rules. If one patentee breaks ranks and charges the highest royalty it can get away with, would the others grin and bear it, and lower their fees to absorb the price increase? It has been suggested that this would in fact happen, even that it would be "fair and reasonable" and consistent with competition law and FRAND promises for a non-vertically-integrated licensor to extract an amount close to full monopoly rent for a patent, leaving the crumbs for the other licensors and licensees. Consumers will not suffer, the argument goes, since a rational analysis of an "ultimatum game" indicates that (a) licensors of complementary essential patents will restrain themselves and seek only the difference between the royalty charged by the first licensor and the monopoly rent, so as to avoid a "Cournot complements" problem, and (b) licensed manufacturers will maintain the price for the end product and lower downstream profits (reducing their reward for innovation and risk downstream).
This argument is probably correct in cases where two cumulative conditions are met: (a) the patents were ex ante essential, absent viable alternatives, and (b) no complementary essential patents nor downstream innovation are needed. 50 If those conditions are met, there was no inter- decision in Microsoft, which concerned software interoperability (see fn. 2 above), was a remedy, and where patents were not ex ante essential. In that case, the Commission appropriately distinguished between two types of "value" transferred to competitors by the compulsory license that the Commission imposed, in a way that is also relevant to standards cases. It differentiated between (a) "'strategic value' stemming from Microsoft's market power", and (b) value derived from true innovation. The former is the amount that Microsoft could extract in a hold-up of the users of its interoperability information, considering that the industry cannot avoid that information because of the need for technology competition to begin with, and the standard agreement is not caught by Article 101(1) TFEU. But if (a) the patents were not ex ante essential or (b) implementation requires complementary patents from other licensors, there are several reasons why this cynical "first mover takes all" approach will not be "fair and reasonable" -apart from the consideration that it will not sound "reasonable" to the proverbial "man in the Clapham Omnibus." 51 First, in the EU (and unlike Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the US), Article 102(a) and (c) TFUE prohibit unfair pricing or unjustified discrimination even in the rare case where no ex ante competition existed, so long as consumer harm ensues from excessive or discriminatory pricing. A "first mover takes all" approach could cause consumer harm by discouraging cooperation by other patentees and reducing investments by licensees in setting and implementing the standard, while the prospect that this is allowed in standard setting generally would dampen the incentives for dynamic competition by developing new technologies that could be used for future standard generations. Article 102 TFEU is appropriately applied where excessive or discriminatory pricing discourages standard implementation, investment in R&D for future standards, or future standard setting, or where it results in a "Cournot problem" or a "game of chicken" (see below). In the US, this may be caught by Section 5 of the US FTC Act.
Second, in game theory, it may indeed be a rational response to an "ultimatum game" for colicensors and licensees to lower their revenue expectations to ensure that the total royalty stack does not exceed monopoly rent. But this is the kind of theory that earns some economists the definition of "academics who tell you why what happens in market reality is impossible in theory." In commercial reality, co-licensors cannot estimate what the monopoly rent is, and will likely try (especially if they have not sunk investments in implementation of the standard) to capture more than the crumbs left by the cynical first-moving licensor. They will want equal or greater remuneration if their technical contribution to the standard was equal or greater as the first mover's. They can do that by raising their rates to the same level as the first licensor, to try and force his rate down -what game theorists call a "game of chicken". They need not even raise rates, but could, for instance, spin off part of their patent portfolio to create one or more additional their servers to communicate with Microsoft clients and servers on an equal footing as Microsoft's servers. In an "ultimatum game", one person is asked to share a stack of money with an unknown counterpart, who can react either by agreeing (in which case the counterpart receives what was offered, and the offeror keeps the rest) or by vetoing (in which case neither party receives anything). The "subgame perfect Nash equilibrium" (the optimal rational outcome) is that the first moving licensor (the offeror) receives close to monopoly rent and the remaining licensors and licensees (the offerees) receive just enough not to turn them away from licensing and implementing. Experimental game theory indicates, however, that most people do not consider the purely rational optimal outcome "fair and reasonable". Ordinary individuals playing ultimatum games tend to share more than the rational minimum with their counterpart. This is known as "iniquity aversion." Cf. for instance A. A. licensors charging equivalent or higher rates for their "new" portfolio. As the IPCom and N-Data cases indicate, any FRAND promise travels with the spun-off patents, but if a FRAND duty were in fact interpreted to leave freedom to charge whatever the market can bear, as opposed to an amount proportionate to the "value" or total technical contribution to the standard, a FRAND promise is no constraint. The result is a mutual hold-up or a prohibitively high royalty stack, all or part of which will be passed on to consumers, 52 and possibly even failure of the standard.
Economic analysis provides a framework for analysis to avoid this tragedy of anti-commons, by defining a "fair and reasonable" royalty not as the rate that the market can bear ex post or that the first mover demands, but as the lower of (a) to not fully grasping the mathematics, but the upshot is that each player obtains a share of the gains that is roughly proportionate to the relative value of his or her contribution. If one player has found a right hand glove and a second player has found a left hand glove, and the goal is to create a pair that can be sold for 6 Euro, both share the revenues 50/50. If two players have found right hand gloves and a third player has found a left hand glove, and the goal is to create a pair that can be sold for 6 Euro, the third player gets 2/3 of the revenues (4 Euro), whereas the first or second player receive 1/6 (1 Euro). (The consumer presumably receives a 1 Euro discount, benefiting from competition between players 1 and 2.) In an ultimatum game, the hard-nosed optimal rational outcome would be for the third player to offer marginal cost + 1 cent to each of players 1 and 2, allowing the third player to keep 5.99 Euro for himself (since they found the gloves and have no marginal costs). It's rational, but is it fair? Interestingly, it appears that the outcome of a one-shot experimental ultimatum game played by Western players would in most cases also result in player 3 receiving 2/3 (4 Euro) and leaving 1/3 (2 Euro) to player 1 and/or 2.
same standard charge for their complementary patents ("proportionality analysis");
ii. A comparison with royalties and terms that the patent owner itself charges for other, comparable, technologies ("proxy analysis");
iii. The "Goldscheider analysis" (which is, however, controversial), which suggests that IP owners in the aggregate should generally be entitled to about 25 percent of the downstream gross profits made on the licensed product.
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Proxies are imperfect, but if an IP owner considers that its patents are worth more than a proportionality or proxy analysis suggests, it can (and bears the burden to) prove that its patents are less vulnerable to challenge, have broader geographic scope or a longer life, convey more value compared to the next best ex ante alternative, etc than the other essential patents, or that it bore greater risk than usual compared to licensees. There is precedent for this switch in the burden of proof.
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-Non-discrimination and no restriction of competition. Participants in standards bodies cannot reasonably be expected to agree to a standard including patents to which they have no access on the same basic terms as other companies implementing the standard. Differential treatment without objective and proportionate justification tilts the competitive playing field and thus prejudices open access. This reduces efficiencies and distorts competition between downstream players to find the optimal implementation. It is, moreover, a way to circumvent royalty constraints, allowing the patent owner to extract monopoly rent by monopolizing the downstream market for products implementing the standard. It is, in fact, a more effective way to do this, since it is difficult to change contractually fixed royalty rates, whereas it is easy for a monopolist to adjust prices for implementations to maximize profits. Monopolizing the downstream market creates the additional problem that it allows the monopolist the ability to manipulate supplies in order to put pressure on members of standards bodies who might otherwise have moved to avoid the monopolist's patents when setting the next standard.
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For these reasons, terms and conditions or price squeezes that have the object or effect of restricting downstream competition, or differential treatment based on whether licensee purchases the licensor's downstream product, should not be allowed under Articles 101(3) and 102 TFEU. In determining the final percentage, adjustments should also be made for the enforceability and essentiality of the patents, the geographic scope of various patents and their remaining life, the costs of complementary technology needed, the value conveyed by the patents compared to the next best ex ante alternative, the risk borne and investments made by the licensee relative to the costs and risks borne by the licensor, the volume of sales expected in the market, and so forth. It should be adjusted downwards for instance, in situations where the licensees take more than the usual risk, or where there were adequate alternatives for the patents in question. But see Uniloc USA Inc. et al. v. Microsoft Corp. et al., case number 2010 -1035 Nor should IPR owners be permitted to extract inadequately remunerated cross-licenses, which reduce incentives to innovate in standards implementation and inter-standard competition.
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Especially in the case of manufacturers controlling large market shares or in the case of de facto or de jure-mandatory standards, finally, standardization must not be exclusive and must not prevent the use of additional technology, or the development of competing standards. In the software-tosoftware interoperability area, where open source is a driver for innovation, this means that open standards licensing policies (to the extent they allow inclusion of patents in standards) should be open source compatible or at least not discriminate against open source.
To summarize, "The acid test for an open standard is whether or not it actually permits substitutability and choice among independent, multi-vendor implementations on different technology platforms with acceptable levels of functionality. The diversity of competing applications that support the standard is also an indication of its openness."
60 And under Article 101(3) TFEU (ex 81(3) EC), the license arrangements should be "allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit" and "not […] . The fragmentation of competition and low levels of vertical and horizontal integration have as a counterpart low levels of inclusion and worrying market status in modem chip market; Imposition of fine and issuance of corrective order for discriminative royalty rates, conditional rebates, etc", July 23, 2009. The EC Commission's case-law and practice in the context of essential facilities suggests that licensors of patents that are essential for compliance with a de jure or de facto mandatory standard should ensure separate accounting for their downstream manufacturing of standard-compliant products, so as to be able to demonstrate that they do not give competitive advantages to their own manufacturing divisions that they withhold from outsiders. The usual objection under US law against price squeeze analysis (that if the supplier has no duty to supply, it cannot have a duty to avoid price squeezing) does not apply where the IP owner promised to license on RAND terms. 59 See also Japan FTC Cease and Desist Order Against Qualcomm, September 20, 2009 (on appeal) For each scenario, RAND analyzes the expected status of innovation, consumer choice, privacy, social cohesion and equality, and identifies a number of critical problems, positive developments, and uncertainties. Experts were then asked to look back from the future and identify the key policy choices that will create desirable outcomes and those that create problems. The report discusses IPRs, privacy, data protection, infrastructure investment, e-commerce and other policy issues. Interesting conclusions are also drawn with respect to open standards and interoperability and net neutrality. RAND mentions, for instance that "The interconnectedness of the [Internet] challenges competition as the sustainable engine of continual improvement. Network externalities favour 'tipping' into monopoly and competition weakens" and the report worries that this may give rise to "a desire to limit interoperability [more] than a desire to innovate and offer effective choice." RAND concludes (p. 132) that Europe and most other major jurisdictions have not tried to regulate the Internet, but "as its spread and importance increase, this may no longer be possible, especially as other regulated activities 'escape' on-line and new policy concerns emerge." The report warns that alternatives to regulation should be considered early in the policy process. For instance (p. xxvi), "the EC can encourage efficient competition among technologies and discourage inefficiently-high incompatibility, through creation or coordination of multi-stakeholder platforms and networks, and by applying multi-stakeholder governance principle. These would be enabling the adoption of common standards and market wide approaches to public policy concerns." Open standards as defined above would appear to present a perfect mix of flexible multi-stakeholder arrangements, ensuring an adequate balance between the need to foster private sector innovation and the need to avoid technological lock-in or gridlock. Indeed, the RAND Report (p. 145) identifies a dozen or so of key goals for DG Information Society to pursue, which include:
-"Guarding openness and open networks"; -"Champion common standards and pre-competitive collaboration"; -"Champion interoperability in all its forms" Drawing attention to economic analysis and using existing literature, the RAND report identifies various tools and associated challenges to achieve these goals (p. 141 ff), which it is worthwhile to mention: -RAND proposes to use a range of ex ante and ex post regulation such as spectrum allocation, competition regulation, telecommunications pricing, interconnection, content regulation, fair competition and merger regulation, consumer protection, privacy, etc. At the same time, it identifies as a key challenge "to balance lightness of touch with credible effectiveness, […] and to prevent capture and/or foreclosure that distort markets and the development of the Internet." Following the principles of open standards set out above should go a long way to meet this challenge, by maintaining adequate involvement of the private sector, while preventing capture and foreclosure.
-RAND approves of EC involvement in IPR regulation, to provide fair returns on risky inventive activity and as a market-based tool to signal where ideas are best applied. Interestingly, the report warns about the "the one-size-fits-all nature of the most common forms of IPR protection". The open standards approach described above is useful to avoid the problems of this "one-size-fits-all" IPR protection, for instance, by allowing for a royalty-free standards approach for software interoperability and royalty-bearing standards in telecommunications and hardware. Other key challenges RAND mentions are "the potential for failure in the market for IPR, the possibility that market power in the market for innovation will spill over into markets for goods and services or vice versa and the possibility that predatory use of IPR […] and strategic incompatibility may undercut the hoped-for benefits." Again, the open standards framework described above would address these concerns, by encouraging standard setting to address incompatibility failures, and ensuring that the necessary patents are available on FRAND terms.
-RAND encourages standard-setting and support for standard-compliant products, including by thoughtful procurement policies in favour of open standards. RAND adds: "Key challenges here are to maintain openness of standards (to avoid lending public support to proprietary standards), to balance the interoperability advantages of standardisation against the potential loss of diversity and inhibition of innovation and to ensure that standardisation enhances the innovativeness and competitiveness of the European economy." While the RAND Report does not further define what "openness of standards" means, and does not propose ways to balance the need for interoperability against the need to maintain product diversity and innovation, it is submitted that the open standards principles mentioned above provide the solution that fits perfectly.
In one respect, however, there is a curious point in RAND's analysis, concerning the role of competition law to guarantee a system of open standards that maintains innovation while preventing IPR gridlock. The RAND Report (p. 131-132) Second, it is true that ex post remedies may not always be effective and anticompetitive behaviour may not always be detected or prohibited ex ante, but where it can, why not use competition law? As the guardian of the Treaty, the Commission should not be allowed to disregard distortions in a sector as important as the Internet. Lessons can be learned from past failures in remedies -as the Commission did in Microsoft, where the 2009 Browser Choice Commitment and Interoperability Undertaking are much more promising than the remedies in the 2004 Decision. Indeed, enforcement action can be a remedy in itself where it deters future violations by the firm or standards body in question, and by others. And in those cases where remedies and anticompetitive behaviour cannot be detected or prohibited ex ante, how could the Commission possibly devise a consumer protection policy that is more effective than competition law? Even if the Commission has a crystal ball and is able to define appropriate ex ante rules, these could more easily and more quickly be set out in the Commission's Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements and applied in cases. 65 The most effective solution, it is submitted, is to define "open standards" as a condition for 63 Jonathan Cave kindly explained this and pointed out that Ofcom has undertaken this in its efforts to overcome lock-in among ADSL subscribers unable to obtain MAC codes or even to make authoritative and meaningful comparisons Third, it should be recalled that the conception and growth of the Internet was government-funded and took place in a public sector and university environment. As the private sector takes over, and the risk of lock and hold-up emerges, it becomes more, not less, important to apply the principles of competition law.
Competition law has the merit of providing a flexible framework that does not require adoption of additional rules. After the closure of the Qualcomm case without action in the EU (although action was taken in Japan and Korea and some settlements were reached), some might question whether competition law can be used to prevent consumer exploitation. Lemley argues that it is even undesirable, and that antitrust is "a back-stop that's going to apply only if private efforts in SSOs and IP law have already failed us." 66 The problem is that private efforts can be blocked by firms that benefit from hold-ups. Experience suggests that this would likely prevent standards organizations -working by consensus -from modifying their IPR Policies meaningfully. At best, this will take a long time, and at worst, it will never happen satisfactorily. The same firms also argue in court that FRAND promises are unenforceable in contract or even under promissory estoppel principles, and are merely a promise to negotiate. Amendments to IP law are not much more promising either. Getting twenty-seven Member States to change their IP laws to prevent hold-ups is probably a pipe-dream. Member States judges are equally unlikely to change the law, since they are much less policy-oriented than their US brethren. Antitrust law seems to be the only available tool to achieve a focused, timely, EU-wide solution. Regulation and IPR laws are blunt instruments with "one-size-fits-all" impact, whereas competition law allows intervention with surgical precision, permits remedies appropriate to address the precise problem and strike the right balance in the specific circumstances of the case, and creates flexible precedent that can be adjusted to new fact patterns. against standards bodies, or prohibiting individual standards, is in many cases impractical, such as with respect to international organizations like ISO and IEEE. 67 In all cases it means punishing the victim rather than the perpetrators of standards manipulation or hold-ups. It is better to take firm action against companies that distort standards practices, impose excessive royalties, or impose restrictive licensing terms.
Fourth, the RAND Report mentions that there may be no counterfactual evidence to demonstrate that alternatives are viable if lock-in is widespread. But competition law provides an elegant way out. In Rambus, for instance, there was evidence that Rambus took steps to conceal its patent and patent applications. Had it really thought that its technology was better than the available alternatives that JEDEC (the standards body) considered, why did it take such steps? By concealing the information, it prevented the counterfactual from materializing, and it should bear the consequences for that: In cases where IPR owners conceal evidence of IPRs, or impose confidentiality clauses preventing licensees from warning standards bodies that royalties are too high or terms are exclusionary, the burden of proof should be switched to the IPR owner to show that no viable alternative existed for their technology and that the standards body would have included their IPR anyway without a FRAND licensing obligation. Case-law provides precedent for such a switch in the burden of proof.
68
A final comment concerns the statement that "many of the specific activities that firms might use for predatory purposes (e.g. proprietary standards, low "penetration" pricing, etc.) are also essential in order to attract complementary content and services to Internet platforms capable of providing effective competition." Of course, low pricing or even giving away products or services may be legitimate in order to foster a network effect or attract business in a two-sided market. Similarly, building products based on proprietary technology like Apple's iPod and iTunes is a legitimate business model. But using closed standards is not "essential" to attract complementary content or services -they are at best neutral in attracting complementary products, and tend to limit competition from substitutes.
To conclude: The RAND Report should be commended for recognizing the importance of open standards, and the criteria suggested above (including the conclusion that software-to-software interoperability standards should be patent or royalty-free where alternative revenue models exist) fit well within this framework. The paragraph on p. 132 should not be relied upon to throw out competition policy as a tool to maintain an open Internet. The comment that "conventional" antitrust policy is less effective, is better understood as a call for application of more innovative competition policy to strengthen open standards and foster consumer welfare and consumer choice, which are the objectives of competition policy. This is also consistent with comments elsewhere in the RAND Report (p. 100, emphasis in original): The EU may consider legislation that lays out a common set of rules for "fair play" in standards negotiation. But while regulation and IPR laws are blunt instruments, competition law properly and energetically applied allows intervention with surgical precision, permits remedies appropriate to address the precise problem and strike the right balance in the specific circumstances of the case, and creates flexible precedent that can be adjusted to new fact patterns. The Commission showed this when it negotiated a browser choice screen for Windows: Competition in browsers creates opportunities for alternative browsers that comply with open standards such as HTLM5, and if enough users exercise that choice, developers will have incentives to use those open standards as well, keeping the Internet open. This remedy, therefore, allows the market to speak. Let's hope that the proposed revision of the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements will reflect this open standards approach, that Commissioner Almunia will apply it, and that Commissioner Kroes will integrate competition policy when setting the Digital Agenda in her new position. 
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